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THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ANSWERED "YES" to the $1.45 
million over-exaction question for 1999. In City of Monterey v. Del 
Monte Dunes at Monterey Ltd., 1 a unanimous court extended the scope 
of compensatory takings review beyond land dedication conditions into 
the realm of regulatory denial. Justice Kennedy's opinion vitalized the 
"legitimate state interests" test from Agins v. City ofTiburon2 to sustain 
an inverse condemnation conclusion and damage award to the frus-
trated developer. 3 A majority of the court also concurred that the trial 
court may delegate this takings conclusion to the jury under federal 
civil rights law.4 The activation of Agins' substantive takings test in 
such challenges and the prospect of continued lay application of con-
1. _U.S. _; 119 S. Ct. 1624 (1999). 
2. 447 u.s. 255, 260 (1980). 
3. 119 S. Ct. at 1645. 
4. !d. at 1642-45 (Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, J., Stevens, J., and Thomas, J., concur-
ring), 1645-50 (Scalia, J. concurring in result). 
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stitutionallaw to development restrictions add uncertain dimensions to 
exactions litigation at the millennium. 
In Del Monte Dunes, the Court also distinguished the instant devel-
opment denial of an inverse condemnation claim from the land dedi-
cation conditions at issue in Dolan v. City of Tigard. 5 This distinction 
enabled the unanimous Court to uphold the trial verdict based on Agins 
and avoid elements of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning invoking the Dolan 
rough proportionality test. Other recent federal and state decisions also 
decline to extend Dolan's applicability beyond individual land dedi-
cation development conditions to other forms of economic exactions. 
This year's exactions and impact fee report focuses on Del Monte 
Dunes, namely its effects on negotiated development, trial practice, and 
on regulatory takings doctrine as defined by judges and juries in civil 
rights litigation. 
I. The Regulatory Exactions Issues Before the Supreme 
Court in Del Monte Dunes 
To provide a context for Del Monte Dunes regulatory takings issues, 
this section reviews the local record and circumstances, the extended 
litigation path through federal courts, and the Supreme Court's decla-
rations regarding applicable facts and law. 
A. The Local Record: Negotiation, Promises, 
and Ultimate Frustration (1981-86) 
The convoluted Monterey trail toward development denial winds from 
a 1981 proposal for 344 units6 through the city commission's rejection 
of a 190-unit site plan in mid-1986. Following negotiations with plan-
ning staff over the original environmental impact report, the developer 
resubmitted a revised tentative map and planned-unit development ap-
plication for 264 units.7 The planning commission rejected this appli-
cation in December 1983.8 At that time, staff indicated that a 224-unit 
development would be more favorably considered.9 On appeal to the 
city council in March 1984, the "suggested" number was reduced to 
190, including a series of conditions, which the city. council approved 
5. /d. at 1635. See also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
6. This initial plan's density was well within the permitted 1 ,000-unit zoning stan-
dards. 119 S. Ct. at 1632. See also Del Monte Dunes at Monterey Ltd. v. City of 
Monterey (II), 95 F.3d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir. 1996); Del Monte Dunes at Monterey Ltd. 
v. City of Monterey (1), 920 F.2d 1496, 1501-07 (9th Cir. 1990). 
7. 119S.Ct.atl632. 
8. Del Monte Dunes v. Monterey/, 920 F.2d at 1502. 
9. !d. 
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as a concept plan. 10 In January 1986, the planning commission ignored 
staff recommendations to approve this resubmitted Tentative Subdivi-
sion Map. 11 The city commission affirmed this denial in June 1986, 
citing environmental impact on the dunes, effect on vegetation and 
habitat for the Smith's Blue Butterfly, and adequate accessP 
As noted in the Supreme Court's recitation of facts, the 37 .6-acre 
coastal property was far from pristine. The site had been used for many 
years as an oil company terminal and tank farm. 13 Its vegetation was 
nearly one-fourth covered by invasive non-native ice plant (used for 
erosion control), which without intervention would be expected to over-
take the diminishing natural buckwheat habitat of the Smith's Blue 
Butterfly. 14 This unflattering description of the pre-application site and 
repeated re-negotiations of the site plan established a local record open 
to question on good faith, fair treatment, and regulatory takings bases. 
B. The Judicial Record in Del Monte Dunes 
( 1986 to 1999) 
After rejection of the revised 190-unit subdivision plan, the developer 
initiated a thirteen-year course through federal courts culminating in 
the May 24, 1999, Supreme Court decision. The original civil rights 
action in federal district court was dismissed, then remanded for trial 
on appeal by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1990. 15 At the 
subsequent trial, the judge instructed the jury to evaluate the merits of 
the § 1983 takings claim and to determine a damage award. 16 The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed this verdict in 1996, applying the rough proportionality 
test from Dolan v. City of Tigard. 17 
At the remanded trial, the plaintiff land developer successfully 
brought a § 1983 action against the City of Monterey and recovered a 
jury award of $1.45 million in damages. 18 The trial judge sent the in-
verse condemnation or takings question to the federal jury to be ana-
10. Nearly half of the negotiated 190-unit plan for the 37.6-acre site was devoted 
to public open space; 7.9 additional acres to open landscaped areas, and only 5.1 acres 
to buildings. 119 S. Ct. at 1632. The 17.9 acres for open space included a public beach 
and areas for the restoration of the buckwheat habitat. 
11. 119 S. Ct. at 1632. 
12. Del Monte Dunes v. Monterey I, 920 F.2d at 1504-05. 
13. Tank pads, pieces of pipe, broken concrete, oil-soaked sand, trash, and a sewer 
line housed in 15-foot man-made dunes were present on the site. Monterey v. Del Monte 
Dunes, 119 S. Ct. at 1631; Del Monte Dunes v. Monterey/, 920 F.2d at 1499. 
14. Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. at 1631-32. 
15. Del Monte Dunes v. Monterey I, 920 F.2d at 1508. 
16. Del Monte Dunes v. Monterey II, 95 F.3d at 1422, 1425. 
17. /d. at 1429-30. 
18. 119 S. Ct. at 1634. 
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lyzed under the two-prong Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 
takings test. 19 This was the same test recognized by the Supreme Court 
in Agins. The unchallenged jury instructions referenced environmental 
protection, open space agricultural protection, "protecting the health 
and safety of its citizens, and regulating the quality of the community 
by looking at development" as illustrations of legitimate public pur-
poses.20 The trial judge stated further: "So one of your jobs as jurors is 
to decide if the city's decision here substantially advanced any such 
legitimate public purpose."21 The instructions then specified the legal 
standard as a reasonable relationship between the city's decision and 
the regulatory purpose. 22 The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff 
without specifying the grounds for its decision.23 
On appeal of this jury verdict, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
addressed two issues: whether the takings issue was properly before 
the jury, and whether the evidence supported the finding that the city 
had affected a taking under the Nollan (Agins) test.24 On the first ques-
tion, the court concluded that the takings issue was properly before the 
jury as either a factual question or a mixed question of fact and law.25 
This holding placed the jury in the position of determining whether the 
regulatory action of the city "advances a legitimate public purpose" 
with the ultimate question being whether these actions-the plan de-
nials-bear a "reasonable relationship" to these public purposes.26 The 
consequence of the jury's finding in the negative on this question was 
that the city had taken the plaintiff's property. 
Regarding the second issue, the Ninth Circuit examined the adequacy 
of the evidence supporting the jury's positive finding and found that 
19. Under the dual takings test, Del Monte had to show that the city's actions either 
(1) did not substantially advance a legitimate public purpose or (2) denied it economi-
cally viable use of its property. See Nollan, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987). Usually said to 
have been articulated in Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), the two-prong test has 
been repeated in a number of subsequent Supreme Court decisions including Nollan, 
Lucas, Dolan, and Del Monte Dunes. Some commentators have objected to the transfer 
of the Nectow/Euclid substantive due process test into the Agins takings formulation, 
but it has persisted in the Supreme Court jurisprudence. See J. JUERGENSMEYER & 
T. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND CONTROL LAW 427-28 (1998). 
20. Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. at 1634. 
21. Id. 
22. !d. 
23. Del Monte Dunes v. Monterey II, 95 F.3d at 1425; Monterey v. Del Monte 
Dunes, 119 S. Ct. at 1634. 
24. 95 F.3d at 1426. 
25. ld. at 1429-30. The Supreme Court would later affirm and concur with this 
characterization of the takings question. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 119 
S. Ct. at 1643-44. 
26. 95 F.3d at 1429. 
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Del Monte Dunes had provided sufficient evidence to rebut each of the 
six reasons given by the city to justify its permit denials.27 Curiously, 
Judge Wallace's opinion added an interpretive wrinkle that combined 
the "substantially advances legitimate state interests" takings test of 
Nollan with the rough proportionality requirement derived from Do-
lan. 28 He stated that even if the city had legitimate reasons for denying 
the permits, "its action must be 'roughly proportional' to furthering that 
interest."29 The court conceded that the city's stated interests for its 
denials were "legitimate" in a traditional substantive due process sense, 
but that there needed to be a correlation between the permit denial and 
the nature and extent of the impact of the proposed development. In 
reviewing the evidence, Judge Wallace concluded that Del Monte 
Dunes had sufficiently rebutted the city's proposed reasons for denying 
the permit with superior data or evidence of the city's inconsistent 
positions regarding the project.30 
Although announcing a novel standard of review for local govern-
ment land-use regulation, the court's approach seemed to maintain the 
traditional allocation of the burden of proof on the challenger. This 
intermediate decision also confirmed an evidentiary showing success-
fully attacking the city's development denial under a rational basis due 
process standard. However, without any particular analysis, the court 
concluded that "[s]ignificant evidence supports Del Monte's claim that 
the City's actions were disproportional [sic] to both the nature and 
extent of the impact of the proposed development."31 This conclusion 
suggests a willingness to extend the Dolan land-use exaction-based 
rough proportionality rule to purely regulatory actions of government. 
C. The Supreme Court Decisions 
in Del Monte Dunes 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court sustained the verdict and damage 
award. All justices agreed that the intermediate court's application of 
the Dolan test was not essential to sustaining the trial court's delegation 
of law. This consensus extended to reliance on a more substantive stan-
dard articulated in Agins, and restated in Nolan, that the decision be 
27. Id. at 1431. 
28. The City of Monterey's Supreme Court brief indicates that this argument was 
not raised by the parties but rather sua sponte by the Ninth Circuit itself. See Brief for 
the Petitioners, 1997 U.S. Briefs 1235, *43 n.10. 
29. Del Monte Dunes v. Monterey II, 95 F.3d at 1430. 
30. Jd. at 1431. 
31. Jd. at 1432. 
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supportive of "legitimate state interests."32 However, only five justices 
concurred on sustaining the trial court's delegation of the takings con-
clusion to the jury. 33 The unanimous Court provided a brief yet direct 
rejection of the Ninth Circuit's position on whether the rough propor-
tionality test applies to the denied development. It clarified that the 
court had not extended applicability of the Dolan test beyond the spe-
cial context of required land dedications as conditions for approving 
development.34 Justice Kennedy carefully added that this rule "was not 
designed to address, and is not readily applicable to, the much different 
questions arising where, as here, the landowner's challenge is based 
not on excessive exactions but on denial of development."35 Rather, the 
Court affirmed the Agins/Nollan test as the applicable standard. 
The Supreme Court also critiqued the city commission's reasons for 
denying the permit rather than specifying conditions for what would 
be an approvable site plan: 
The council did not base its decision on the landowners' failure to meet any of the 
specific conditions earlier prescribed by the city. Rather, the council made general 
findings that the landowners had not provided adequate access for the development 
(even though the landowners had twice changed the specific access plans to comply 
with the city's demands and maintained they could satisfy the city's new objections 
32. The two-pronged test emanating from Justice Brennan's summary comments 
in Penn Central quickly took on a life of its own and was expressed as general con-
stitutional law theory in the 1981 case of Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 257, 261 
(1980). Argued as a case alleging that a zoning ordinance took the plaintiffs property 
without just compensation, Justice Powell articulated the takings test in the following 
terms: "The application of a general zoning law to a particular property effects a taking 
if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests ... or denies 
an owner economically viable use of his land .... " 447 U.S. at 260. The inclusion of 
the due process prong has been severely criticized by academic commentators. See, 
e.g., R. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 519 (2d ed. 1993), and JUER-
GENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 19, at 427-28 (West 1998). See also Michael J. 
Davis & Robert L. Glicksman, To the Promised Land: A Century of Wandering and a 
Final Homeland for the Due Process and Taking Clauses, 68 OR. L. REv. 393 (1989). 
However, the Agins test has been consistently restated, without much analysis, in the 
line of Supreme Court takings cases decided throughout the 1980s and 1990s. See 
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Nollan v. 
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). Ironically, substantive due process judicial 
review of social and economic laws has become increasingly less frequent and usually 
unsuccessful as the federal courts have been reluctant to revive the intrusive review 
associated with the Lochner era. However, the substantive due process "takings" ar-
gument, with its recent Supreme Court approval, has found its way into modem land-
use cases including the Del Monte Dunes litigation where it was central to the jury's 
verdict that the city had taken the plaintiffs property. 
33. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. at 1642-45 (Kennedy, J., 
Rehnquist, J., Stevens, J., and Thomas, J., concurring), 1645-50 (Scalia, J., concurring 
in result). 
34. /d. at 1634. 
35. /d. To reinforce this point, the unanimous portion of the opinion added that 
the rough proportionality test of Dolan was "inapposite to a case such as this one." /d. 
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if granted an extension), that the plan's layout would damage the environment (even 
though the location of the development on the property was necessitated by the city's 
demands for a public beach, view corridors, and a buffer zone next to the state park), 
and that the plan would disrupt the habitat of the Smith's Blue Butterfly (even though 
the plan would remove the encroaching ice plant and preserve or restore buckwheat 
habitat on almost half of the property, and even though only one larva had ever been 
found on the property). 36 
While Justice Kennedy did not specifically link these parenthetical re-
buttals to the city's reasons for denial to the A gins standard, it is evident 
that they could bolster a jury's determination that frustrated negotia-
tions and the ultimate development denial could be found insufficiently 
supportive of legitimate state interests. 
When addressing the verdict finding a regulatory taking, the Supreme 
Court selectively affirmed the Ninth Circuit's reasoning. Since the trial 
court instructions did not mention proportionality, the high court 
averted supporting the applicability of the Dolan test. 37 Rather, the 
unanimous Court relied on the appellate conclusion that a reasonable 
jury could find that a nexus was lacking between the development de-
nial and the legitimate public interests of local land-use regulation.38 
Justice Kennedy's opinion stated further that it was not the city's gen-
eral zoning powers, but rather the particular zoning decision that was 
at issue. 39 A majority of the Court then concluded that the trial judge's 
instructions correctly limited the jury's scope of inquiry to not "con-
sider the reasonableness, per se, of the customized, ad hoc conditions 
imposed on the property's development." 
Rather, the jury was instructed to consider whether the city's denial of the final 
proposal was reasonably related to a legitimate public purpose. Even with regard to 
this issue, however, the jury was not given free rein to second-guess the city's land-
use policies. Rather, the jury was instructed, in unmistakable terms, that the various 
purposes asserted by the city were legitimate public interests. 
The jury, furthermore, was not asked to evaluate the city's decision in isolation 
but rather in context, and, in particular, in light of the tortuous and protracted history 
of attempts to develop the property. 
In short, the question submitted to the jury on this issue was confined to whether, 
in light of all the history and the context of the case, the city's particular decision 
to deny Del Monte Dunes' final development proposal was reasonably related to the 
city's proffered justifications. This question was couched, moreover, in an instruction 
that had been proposed in essence by the city, and as to which the city made no 
objection. 40 
36. /d. at 1633 (emphasis added). 
37. /d. at 1635. 
38. 119 S. Ct. at 1635. 
39. /d. 
40. /d. at 1636-37 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court majority also referenced 
a trial statement from developer's counsel: 
Del Monte Dunes partnership did not file this lawsuit because they were complaining 
about giving the public the beach, keeping it [the development] out of the view shed, 
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These validated instructions provide conflicting messages: the matter 
is confined first to the specific municipal decision to deny the devel-
opment; however, this ultimate denial may be linked to the entire record 
of city-developer interactions. With these dual directives, the jury could 
reason a regulatory takings conclusion incorporating substantive in-
quiry into the fairness of the entire development review process. 
II. Nollan/Dolan Decisions Continue to Limit Rough 
Proportionality to Land Use 
Decisions through mid-1999 continue to limit Nollan and Dolan's ap-
plicability to land-use exactions. A follow-up Eighth Circuit federal 
appeals decision reaffirmed Dolan's applicability to a mandatory land 
dedication condition for road improvements. Two Washington appellate 
decisions apply high scrutiny to onsite and offsite road exactions. The 
Maine Supreme Court applied this two-part test with greater deference 
to local decision-making, while California's Land gate decision found 
the test inapplicable to coastal development permit denial. Other recent 
cases reinforce Dolan's limitation to physical dedications, and therefore 
inapplicable to economic exactions in the contexts of relocation assis-
tance exactions and rent control. 
A. Dolan Rough Proportionality Applied 
to Conditional Development Approvals 
In its second review of a case remanded for application of the Dolan 
test,41 the federal Eighth Circuit sustained the district court's conclusion 
that the city failed to sustain its burden to show rough proportionality. 
In Goss v. City of Little Rock (II),42 the city had denied a commercial 
rezoning application when the property owner refused to accept a re-
quired dedication of 22 percent of his land for expansion of an adjacent 
highway.43 In the remanded trial, the district court concluded that a 
taking occurred due to the government's failure to make an "individ-
ualized determination that the required dedication is related both in 
nature and scope to the proposed development. "44 
devoting and [giving] to the State all this habitat area. One-third [of the] property is 
going to be given away for the public use forever. That's not what we filed the 
lawsuit about (conceding that the city may "ask an owner to give away a third of 
the property without getting a dime in compensation for it and providing parking 
lots for the public and habitats for the butterfly, and boardwalks"). 
119 S. Ct. at 1636 (citations omitted). 
41. See Goss v. Little Rock, 90 F.3d 306, 310 (8th Cir. 1996). 
42. 151 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 1998). 
43. !d. at 862. 
44. !d. (citing Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391). 
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The Eighth Circuit sustained the trial court holdings that: the city did 
meet the Nolan nexus requirement based on its interest in preventing 
increased traffic that could result from commercial use,45 but did not 
sufficiently prove a rough proportionality between the dedication and 
speculative traffic impacts.46 The appellate court also dismissed a sub-
stantive due process claim as irrelevant to the takings issue,47 and sus-
tained the district court's denial of compensatory damages.48 However, 
it reversed the district court's remedy commanding a rezoning without 
the required dedication,49 and enabled a partial award of attorney fees 
commensurate with the property owner's limited success in litigation.50 
Ironically, the court notes that the city could deny the rezoning outright, 
i.e., without the dedication condition. 5 1 Since Goss II pre-dates the Su-
preme Court's Del Monte Dunes decision, future denials or conditions 
could be affected by evolving takings doctrine and potential jury de-
termination of appropriate remedies. 
Two Washington Division Two Court of Appeals decisions apply 
substantial detail to invalidate development conditions. Burton v. Clark 
County52 found that the county had not sustained its burden of proof 
under Dolan in conditioning approval of a three-lot short plat on ded-
icating a right-of-way and building a road, curbs, and sidewalks. While 
the court accepted the legitimate governmental purpose for street con-
nectivity within the county, 53 it found that the record lacked a basis for 
inferring that the exacted road would connect to a nearby avenue in the 
foreseeable future. Thus, the county had failed in its burden to show 
that the exaction would solve or even alleviate the traffic problems it 
identified. 54 
45. /d. at 863. 
46. The city's witness referred to traffic impacts that could "conceivably" be gen-
erated if a strip mall were erected, but could not refer to any plans or reason to expect 
one to be built. 151 F.3d at 863. 
47. /d. 
48. /d. at 864. 
49. !d. at 863-64. 
50. !d. at 864-66. 
51. 151 F.3d at 864. 
52. 958 P.2d 343 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998),pet.for rev. denied, 978 P.2d 1097 (Wash. 
1999). 
53. !d. at 349. . 
54. The Burton court identified four elements in Nollan, Dolan, and Washington 
courts: 
First, when the government conditions a land-use permit, it must identify a public 
problem or problems that the condition is designed to address .... Second, the gov-
ernment must show that the development for which a permit is sought will create or 
exacerbate the identified public problem .... 
Third, the government must show that its proposed condition or exaction (which 
in plain terms is just the government's proposed solution to the identified public 
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In Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle Ground, 55 the city required 
a proposed twenty-acre subdivision to pay for constructing half-street 
improvements to an adjoining, but unconnected street.56 The court re-
jected the defenses that Dolan would not apply because the ordinance 
applied to all new subdivisions,57 or that it involved a fee rather that 
direct land dedication.58 Both the town's and Benchmark's traffic stud-
ies concluded that traffic increases on this street would be rninimal.59 
The appellate court concluded that the city's ordinance failed to meet 
the requirement of rough proportionality because there was "no nec-
essary correlation between the extent a development borders a street 
and the extent to which residents of the development will actually use 
the street."60 
The Maine Supreme Court applied the two-part Nollan/Dolan test 
less demandingly to sustain a subdivision approval condition requiring 
a fire protection easement and construction of a fire pond.61 Its review 
of the record granted initial deference to the town's legislative program, 
but noted that the rough proportionality standard cannot be satisfied by 
a conclusory statement made by the government authority.62 The court 
then considered how the ordinance was applied to the property and held 
problem) tends to solve, or at least to alleviate, the identified public problem. In 
other words, the government must show a relationship ("nexus") between the pro-
posed solution and the identified problem, and such relationship cannot exist unless 
the proposed solution has a tendency to solve or alleviate the identified problem. 
Fourth, the government must show that its proposed solution to the identified 
public problem is "roughly proportional" to that part of the problem that is created 
or exacerbated by the landowner's development. 
When combined, these four propositions boil down to two relationships: a rela-
tionship between the project and the identified public problem, and a relationship 
between the identified public problem and the proposed solution to that problem. 
The required relationship between project and problem is shown by establishing the 
first and second propositions set forth above, while the required relationship between 
problem and solution is shown by establishing the third and fourth propositions set 
forth above. The ultimate goal is to show that the proposed condition or exaction 
(i.e., the proposed solution to an identified public problem) is reasonably related to 
all or part of an identified public problem that arises from (i.e., is created or exac-
erbated by) the development project. Unless the government makes this showing, it 
lacks a "legitimate state interest" or a "legitimate public purpose" in imposing the 
condition or exaction. 
/d. at 353-55. 
55. 972 P.2d 944 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). 
56. /d. at 946. 
57. Id. at 949. 
58. /d. at 949-50. The court relied on the reasoning from the remanded California 
decision in Ehrlich v. Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996), on remand from Ehrlich 
v. City of Culver City, 512 U.S. 1231 (1994). 
59. Benchmark v. City of Battle Ground, 972 P.2d at 949. 
60. /d. 
61. Curtis v. South Thomaston, 708 A.2d 657, 658-59 (Me. 1998). 
62. /d. at 659. 
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that a "more than sufficient proportionality exists between the fire pro-
tection demands created by the subdivision plan and the easement re-
quirement designed to meet these demands."63 
In Land gate, Inc. v. California Coastal Commission, 64 the California 
Supreme Court held in a closely divided four-to-three decision that 
Nollan/Dolan was inapplicable to a temporary takings claim arising out 
of a denial of a development permit.65 The case involved denial of a 
coastal development permit to build a single-family residence in the 
City of Malibu.66 These permits are required in addition to any munic-
ipal land-use approvals.67 The commission denied the permit and an 
application for a lot line adjustment upon the grounds of excessive 
building height and grading.68 The ultimate result for the landowner 
was a two-year delay in the permit approval process.69 The trial court 
entered judgment in an inverse condemnation action in favor of the 
plaintiff, and awarded damages in excess of $155,000.70 The interme-
diate appellate court affirmed this judgment; but the Supreme Court 
reversed and remanded to the trial court, with directions to grant the 
commission's motion for summary judgment on the takings claim and 
plaintiffs motion for summary adjudication.71 
Against this factual and procedural background, the Supreme Court 
initially held that the commission's denial of the permit application 
advanced legitimate governmental interests in minimizing erosion and 
unsightly development in the coastal area.72 In addition, the California 
high court held that a legally erroneous decision of a government 
agency during the development approval process does not result in the 
sort of delay which constitutes a temporary taking. After conducting 
an extensive survey of applicable law, the court concluded that a reg-
ulatory mistake resulting in delay does not, by itself, amount to a taking 
of property.73 In this case, the two-year time loss was characterized as 
63. /d. at 660. 
64. 953 P.2d 1188 (Cal. 1998). 
65. /d. at 1198. 
66. /d. at 1189-94. 
67. /d. at 1198. 
68. /d. at 1191-92. 
69. Landgate, 953 P.2d at 1193. 
70. /d. 
71. /d. at 1204. 
72. /d. at 1191-92. 
73. /d. at 1195-98. In reaching this decision, the California high court observed 
that recent cases suggest that judicial review of governmental conditions imposed upon 
development will be more deferential when "the conditions are simply restrictions on 
land use" rather than "requirements that the property owner convey a portion of his 
property" or "pay development fees imposed on a property owner on an individual and 
discretionary basis." /d. at 1198-99. 
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a "normal delay"74 countenanced in First English Church v. Los Angeles 
County. 75 Viewed within this perspective, the Supreme Court rejected 
the application of Nollan and Ehrlich because the instant case neither 
·embraced compulsory conveyances of land nor the imposition of in-
dividualized development fees. 76 Instead, the case involved the denial 
of a permit without these kinds of exactions.77 
Consequently, Landgate indicates that Nollan/Dolan will be applied 
in a California takings challenge only when the conditions of devel-
opment approval encompass conveyances or monetary exactions, and 
in the case of monetary exactions, they must be adjudicatively imposed, 
instead of legislatively imposed.78 Any other condition of development 
approval will be viewed as a "land use restriction" which will cause a 
regulatory taking only when the effect of the restriction is to deprive 
the property owner of all economically viable, beneficial, or productive 
use.79 The Landgate case is also interesting from a Nollan/Dolan stand-
point because the court held that the proper judicial inquiry is an ob-
jective one: whether there is a "sufficient connection" between the land-
use regulation and a legitimate governmental purpose so that the former 
may be said to substantially advance the latter.80 
B. Dolan Test Held Inapplicable to Non-Land Use 
Economic Regulations 
In Garneau v. City of Seattle, 81 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that the Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny standard of review does not 
apply to facial taking claims against a Tenant Relocation Assistance 
Ordinance.82 Pursuant to Washington State's Growth Management Act, 
the Seattle law required landlords to pay to displaced tenants the sum 
of $1,000 upon demolition, substantial rehabilitation, change of use, or 
restriction removal of low-income rental units located within the city.83 
Owners of rental units within the city brought a takings claim on the 
ground that the forced relocation payment amounted to an unconstitu-
74. Landgate, 953 P.2d at 1193-95. 
75. 482 u.s. 304 (1987). 
76. 953 P.2d at 1198-99. 
77. !d. But see Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1234-35, 1255 (Nev. 1999) (interim damage awards for 
building moratorium ordinances and continued staff development denials for the period 
from 1981 through 1986). 
78. Landgate, 953 P.2d at 1198-99. 
79. /d. at 1199. 
80. /d. 
81. 147 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1998). 
82. !d. at 808-11. 
83. /d. at 804. 
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tional exaction in violation of the Dolan standard of review. Plaintiffs' 
argument was based on the $1 ,000 per tenant monetary exaction being 
"not roughly proportional to the harm caused by their proposed rede-
velopment project."B4 
Plaintiff property owners asserted both facial and as-applied regu-
latory takings claims grounded in the Nollan/Dolan analytical ap-
proach.85 The majority through Judge Brunetti initially concluded that 
the Nollan/Dolan cases do not apply to a facial attack on a monetary 
exaction ordinance.86 Consequently, the majority affirmed the district 
court's summary judgment on the grounds that (1) the Nollan/Dolan 
cases did not apply to facial claims, only to as-applied claims; (2) the 
plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their as-applied claims; and (3) the 
plaintiffs willfully refused to produce any evidence of economic im-
pact.87 In a sober conclusion to this case, the majority observed that it 
was forced to uphold the city's ordinance in large part because evidence 
of economic impact of the ordinance was relevant to plaintiffs' takings 
claims, yet the plaintiffs steadfastly refused to produce such evidence.88 
A concurring opinion decided that the Dolan case did not apply because 
the owners did not put forth any argument that the ordinance dispos-
sessed them of any property or impaired the development potential (or 
84. /d. at 806. The plaintiffs also asserted claims based upon the Substantive Due 
Process Clause; however, these claims were rejected summarily based upon Macri v. 
King County, 126 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 1997), because the Takings Clause provides 
an explicit source of constitutional protection against the challenged governmental 
conduct, in which case, a substantive due process claim under these circumstances is 
no longer recognized by the Ninth Circuit as a matter of law. See also Armendariz v. 
Penman, 75 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1996) (en bane), and Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868 
(9th Cir. 1996), which manifest the law of the circuit that the Substantive Due Process 
Clause may not be used as a substitute for a regulatory takings claim grounded in the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. For discussion, see Michael C. Spata, Armendariz 
v. Penman: The Ninth Circuit's Requiem for the Substantive Due Process Clause as 
an Alternative to a Regulatory Takings Claim, 1997 CAL. ENVT'L. L. REP. 251, 257-
59 (Oct. 1997), cited in CURTIN's CALIFORNIA LAND USE PLANNING LAW 179 n.9 
(18th ed. 1998). 
85. Garneau, 147 F.3d at 805. Following the close of discovery and the submittal 
of a lengthy stipulation of facts, the district court granted the city's motion for summary 
judgment against the facial takings claims on the ground that the ordinance reasonably 
related to a legitimate state interest. /d. at 806. The district court also dismissed the 
substantive due process claims for relief. /d. 
86. /d. at 806-07. The court reasoned that the nucleus of facts did not present a 
categorical or per se taking under Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1016 (1992), in which case, the multi-factor test announced in Penn Central 
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), was applicable, which required, 
in part, that the aggrieved party show the economic impact of the regulation and the 
extent to which the regulation interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations. 
/d. at 807. 
87. Garneau, 147 F.3d at 807-13. 
88. /d. 
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value) of the property. 89 Interestingly, this opinion stated that the Dolan 
analysis is better rooted in a substantive due process and equal protec-
tion analysis rather than a takings analysis.90 Judge O'Scanlain dis-
sented on the ground that the Nollan/Dolan cases should apply.91 
In Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. v. Superior Court (Santa Monica Rent 
Control Board), 92 a divided California Supreme Court held that the 
general application of a rent control ordinance to a particular individual 
was not subject to the heightened scrutiny test articulated in the Nol-
lan/Dolan decisions.93 The plaintiff landlord sought an adjustment un-
der a local rent control law for a twelve-unit apartment building.94 Fol-
lowing administrative proceedings held pursuant to the local ordinance, 
a hearing examiner issued a ruling allowing a modest rent increase.95 
The rent control board affirmed this ruling, and the landlord filed a 
mandamus action and a complaint for inverse condemnation under the 
United States and California Constitutions.96 
In its complaint, Santa Monica Beach, Ltd. contended that the ap-
plication of the city's rent control law constituted a taking because the 
application of the ordinance did not substantially advance its stated 
goals to produce affordable housing for the poor and elderly.97 The 
plaintiff contended further that the ordinance did not substantially mit-
igate the purported social harm that would otherwise result from the 
unregulated use of rental property because the ordinance's effect was 
to reduce affordable rental housing rather than to increase its supply. 
Based upon this reasoning, the plaintiff contended that, under the 
heightened scrutiny test, the ordinance did not substantially advance its 
stated purpose.98 On appeal of the trial court's dismissal, the appellate 
89. !d. at 819. 
90. !d. at 819-21. 
91. !d. at 813 (O'Scanlain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). His dis-
senting view reasoned that under Nollan/Dolan: (1) the exactions were not roughly 
proportional to the harm caused by the landlords; (2) the Supreme Court's vacating 
and remanding of Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 512 U.S. 1231 (1994), to the California 
Supreme Court suggests that the Dolan "rough proportionality" test applies to monetary 
exactions; and (3) the exaction was tantamount to a physical occupation because it 
deprived the owners of their right to exclude the tenants. !d. at 813-17. 
92. 968 P.2d 993 (Cal. 1999). For discussion of Santa Monica Beach, Ltd., see 
Daniel J. Curtin & M. Johanna Sherlin, California Supreme Court Rejects Higher-
Scrutiny Standard for Takings Claim Based on Rent Control Law, Adopts "Hands-
Off'' Policy For Land Use Legislation, McCUTCHEN UPDATE (Jan. 8, 1999); Michael 
M. Berger, Golden State of Confusion, S.F. DAILY J., Jan. 28, 1999, at 4, col.2; and 
Susannah T. French, Commentary-Heightened Scrutiny Inapplicable to Claims of 
Taking by Rent Control, 1999 CAL. ENVT'L. L. REP. 54 (Feb. 1999). 
93. Santa Monica Beach, 968 P.2d at 1005-06. 
94. /d. at 996. 
95. /d. 
96. !d. at 996-97. 
97. !d. at 997. 
98. Santa Monica Beach, 968 P.2d at 997-98. 
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court directed that the complaint for inverse condemnation be rein-
stated, and that the Nollan standard be applied to the city's rent control 
law.99 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court granted review, and held 
that "the heightened intermediate scrutiny standard articulated in Not-
ian and Dolan does not apply" to a rent control challenge. 100 Instead, 
the standard of review for generally applicable rent control laws must 
be at least as deferential as for generally applicable zoning laws and 
other legislative land-use controls; and as such, the party challenging 
rent control must show that the application of the law constitutes "an 
arbitrary regulation of property rights."101 The California high court 
further stated that heightened scrutiny is more appropriate for adjudi-
catory decisions involving land dedications and development fees that 
are imposed on an individualized basis. 102 
A novelty in the Santa Monica takings challenge was that the land-
lord conceded the validity of the rent control ordinance adopted many 
years earlier, but with the passage of time, the purposes of the ordinance 
were not accomplished. After considering this factual paradigm, the 
majority stated that there is no constitutional requirement that legisla-
tion substantially serve stated goals. 103 The majority concluded by say-
ing that the plaintiff was still free to pursue its administrative manda-
mus claim on the grounds that the city exceeded its legal authority 
under its local charter, and that the board's ruling deprived the plaintiff 
of a fair return on investment. 104 
A concurring opinion in the Santa Monica rent control as illegal 
exactions challenge indicated that there were two questions raised by 
the Nollan/Dolan cases which produced a great deal of uncertainty; 
namely, (1) What is the meaning of the "substantially advance" test 
outside the scope of Nollan/Dolan cases? and (2) Outside the Nol-
lan/Dolan context, is a means-end test an appropriate measure of 
whether a regulatory taking has occurred?105 Although Justice Kennard 
was inclined to interpret the "substantially advance" test as a "rational 
relationship" test consistent with traditional substantive due process 
analysis, she urged the United States Supreme Court to resolve these 
questions when the next opportunity arises. 106 
99. /d. at 998. 
100. /d. at 1001. 
101. /d. 
102. /d. at 1001--02. 
103. Santa Monica Beach, 968 P.2d at 1004. 
104. /d. at 1007. 
105. /d. at 1008. 
106. /d. at 1008--09. 
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The dissenting opinions would find Nollan/Dolan applicable to rent 
control. Justice Baxter strongly asserted that the trial court should have 
been allowed to carry out its constitutionally mandated judicial obli-
gation to determine, on the basis of evidence to be presented, whether 
application of the Santa Monica ordinance has taken property from the 
plaintiff without just compensation. 107 He concluded that the ordinance 
in question forces owners of rental property to bear a public burden for 
which the takings clause mandates just compensation under a Nol-
lan/Dolan analytical framework. 108 
Justice Chinn also criticized that the majority "inappropriately con-
ftates takings jurisprudence with due process jurisprudence .... " 109 He 
noted that even if the court was skeptical about plaintiff's ability to 
prove its case, it should be given the chance to try without having to 
prove a due process case when it initiated a takings case. 110 A dissenting 
opinion by Justice Brown challenged the majority's assertion that the 
heightened intermediate scrutiny standard articulated in Nollan/Dolan 
did not apply as more "wish than fact." 111 She concluded by stating that 
if rent control measures are capable of withstanding a Nollan-inspired 
takings analysis, then the U.S. Supreme Court "ought to tell us so, 
preferably sooner than later."112 
III. Impact Fee Case Law Update 
In contrast to potential volatility in current exactions law, impact fee 
cases continue predictably to address threshold and administrative is-
sues. Colorado's statewide school impact fee may be administered by 
individual school districts. The Michigan Supreme Court distinguished 
a stormwater regulatory charge as a tax subject to voter approval re-
quirements. Other cases address issues in impact fee administration 
including standing, 113 notice of appeal rights, 114 and refunds. 115 
107. !d. at 983-1018. 
108. Santa Monica Beach, 968 P.2d at 1016. 
109. /d. 
110. !d. at 1040. 
111. /d. at 1047. 
112. /d. 
113. See, e.g., Barnhart v. City of Fayetteville, 977 S.W.2d 225,227-28 (Ark. 1998) 
(affirming dismissal of challenge to city's sanitation charge based on claim of contract); 
Building Industry Ass'n v. Mannheim Township, 710 A.2d 141, 147 (Pa. Cmmwth. 
1998) (Building Association lacked standing to seek refund of impact fees paid by its 
members). 
114. See St. Charles Assocs. v. County Comm'rs, 1998 Md. Tax LEXIS 3 (Md. Tax 
Ct. 1998) (remanding impact fee assessment notice that did not indicate process for 
appeals). 
115. See id. at *1-2; Building Industry Ass'n, 710 A.2d at 147. 
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The Colorado Supreme Court sustained a constitutional amendment 
establishing a statewide school impact fee against a single-subject state 
constitutional challenge.I 16 Under this new provision, local school dis-
tricts may implement the fee of up to $7,500 per newly constructed 
housing unit through initiative or referendum. Collected funds are re-
quired to be "used for public school facilities necessitated by the in-
creased student population .... " 117 
Michigan's Supreme Court proposed a strict standard for permissible 
regulatory charges: 
Where the charge for either storm or sanitary sewers reflects the actual costs of use, 
metered with relative precision in accordance with available technology, including 
some capital investment component, sewerage may properly be viewed as a utility 
service for which usage-based charges are permissible, and not as a disguised 
tax .... 118 
The court found that while the charge would be applied equally to 
all ratepayers, 75 percent were already served by a separated storm and 
sanitary sewer system, many of which were financed through special 
assessments. 119 Under Michigan law, the court concluded that this was 
"an investment in infrastructure as opposed to a fee designed simply to 
defray the costs of a regulatory activity."120 Once characterized as a tax 
rather than regulation, the storm water charge could not be enacted with-
out prior voter approval. 121 
IV. Concluding Observations 
As the litigation record in Del Monte Dunes indicates, the initiative to 
extend the constitutional meaning and effect of the Takings Clause can 
originate in the lower federal courts without suggestion from the parties 
themselves. These doctrinal extensions make it possible for a federal 
judge or a jury to weigh the constitutionality of land-use regulatory 
actions under the Takings Clause while using due process concepts. 
Such possibilities of federal court intervention become even more dis-
turbing to state and local government when the constitutionally man-
dated compensation remedy of the Takings Clause is considered. Even 
in the heyday of substantive due process judicial review symbolized by 
Lochnerv. New York, 122 the federal courts could only invalidate state legis-
116. Howes v. Hayes, 962 P.2d 927 (Colo. 1998). 
117. /d. at 928. 
118. Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264 (Mich. 1998), reh'g denied, 459 
Mich. 1233 (1999). 
119. /d. at 266. 
120. /d. at 270. 
121. /d. at 266, 268-74. 
122. 198 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1905) (invalidating state labor law limiting work week to 
sixty hours on due process grounds). 
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lation. The Del Monte Dunes case sets the stage for even more sweeping 
court review under the Takings Clause as interpreted by juries. 
The Supreme Court's decision not to extend Dolan rough propor-
tionality analysis into review of regulatory discretion denying a devel-
opment permit has been heralded as a victory for land-use control agen-
cies. Rejection of the Ninth Circuit's adoption of a novel, unargued 
constitutional rule may also send a thwarting message toward judicial 
activism in the lower federal courts. However, the Del Monte Dunes 
decision clearly opens the door in property-based civil rights actions 
for takings and substantive due process claims emanating from devel-
opment denials. Furthermore, the Court has already ruled in Dolan that 
"disproportionate" land-use conditions may be invalidated. Any of 
these regulatory challenges could reach a federal or state jury if they 
survive preliminary challenges as takings cases with potentially serious 
compensation at issue. These are all potential consequences of imple-
menting the Agins definition of an unconstitutional taking by way of § 
1983 and constitutional actions. 
Thus, the millennium brings an era of jury empowerment to deter-
mine legitimacy of governmental purpose, reasonable relationships be-
tween regulatory intent and individual development conditions or de-
nials, and valuations for compensatory takings. Inquiries into whether 
a regulated landowner has been deprived of all economically viable use 
involves such quantitative analysis, doctrinal inquiries, and discern-
ment that Professor Haar has compared them to the physicist's search 
for the quark. 123 Justice Kennedy also acknowledged that this task pres-
ents juries with a "more difficult question." 124 Future cases will deter-
mine the wisdom of extending jury resolution of these complex land-
use issues. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will also clarify the confusing 
overlap between the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the Takings Clause of the Fifth and for once explain why the Con-
stitution mandates that a violation of substantive due process must be 
remedied by Fifth Amendment compensation. 
123. See Williamson County Reg'! Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 
172, 199 (1985); San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 
650 (Brennan, J., dissenting). "The attempt to determine when regulation goes so far 
that it becomes, literally or figuratively, a 'taking' has been called the 'lawyer's equiv-
alent of the physicist's hunt for the quark.' C. HAAR, LAND-USE PLANNING 766 (3d 
ed. 1976)." Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 199, n.l7. 
124. Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 119 S. Ct. at 1644. 
